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Stock Redemptions Through
The Use of Controlled Corporations:
Why Haserot Was Wrong
Kenneth S. Cohen*
Both sections 304 and 351 of the Internal Revenue Code may arguably be
said to govern certain transfers of stock in controlled corporations even
though the tax consequences can vary considerably depending upon which
section is held to cover the transaction. After examining the arguments which
have attempted to resolve this apparent conflict, the author suggests that a
careful reading of the Code and its legislative history demonstrates that there
is in fact no conflict between sections 304 and 351, and that section 304 is the
principal governing provision in such transactions.
F OR WELL OVER A DECADE, courts and commentators have
struggled with an apparent conflict between sections 3041 and 3512
of the Internal Revenue Code. Under essentially identical facts,
taxpayers transferring stock in one corporation to a related corporation3
in exchange for stock and cash in the second corporation, have re-
ceived different treatment. Where section 304 was said to control the
transfer, the amount taxable on the transaction was treated as ordinary
income; where section 351 was said to control, the taxable gain was
treated as capital gain.
Arguments advanced to resolve this "conflict" between the two
sections have thus far been generally inconclusive. It is the purpose of
this article to demonstrate that, in fact, no genuine conflict exists, and
that the statutory scheme, as evidenced by the legislative history of
section 351, clearly indicates that section 304 is the primary and
predominant section to be applied in such transactions. 4
* B.S. (1964), New York University; LL.B. (1968), Harvard University. The
author is Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. He is
admitted to the Ohio Bar.
The author wishes to thank Mr. John Dorocak for his valuable assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1. I.R.C. § 304.
2. Id.§351.
3. Related corporations in terms of § 304 are either parent-subsidiary or brother-
sister corporations. Parent-subsidiaries exist where one corporation owns 50% or more
of another. Id. § 304(a)(2). Brother-sister corporations exist when there is common
control through 50% or more ownership of two corporations. Id. § 304(a)(1).
4. The controversy has centered, for the most part, around the cash involved in
such transactions, and the analysis herein is directed primarily to that aspect of the
problem. See note 61 infra.
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I. COVERAGE OF THE SECTIONS
Section 304(a)(1) of the Code provides that if "one or more
persons are in control5 of each of two corporations, and. . . in return
for property, one of the corporations acquires stock in the other
corporation from the person (or persons) so in control" then, for the
purpose of applying section 302,6 the stock shall be treated as having
been redeemed by the corporation making the acquisition. 7 The pur-
pose of the provision is to prevent the bailout of corporate earnings by
the device of having brother-sister corporations purchase each other's
stock from controlling shareholders. 8
To illustrate the application of the section, assume A owns all of
the stock of Corporations X and Y, and X purchases stock from A in
Y. Under section 304, the purchase price will be treated as a distribu-
tion in redemption of the stock of Corporation X. The redemption will
then be tested under section 302 by reference to the stock of Corpora-
tion Y (since this is the only stock the ownership of which is changing
5. For purposes of § 304, "control" is defined as "the ownership of stock posses-
sing at least 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled
to vote, or at least 50 percent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock." I.R.C. §
304(c)(1).
6. I.R.C. § 302. Section 302 provides that a corporate redemption of stock can
qualify for exchange treatment instead of § 301 treatment (usually ordinary income
treatment) if any one of the tests of § 302(b) are met. The three main tests of subsection
(b) are contained in (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3). For convenience, they are often applied in
reverse order. Subsection (b)(3) provides exchange treatment for a redemption of a
shareholder's stock if that shareholder's interest in the corporation is completely ter-
minated. Subsection (b)(2) provides exchange treatment if the redemption is "substan-
tially disproportionate," which generally means that after the redemption the sharehold-
er must own less than 50% of the voting power of the corporation and must have suffered
a more than 20% decrease in his voting power as a result of the redemption. Subsection
(b)(1) provides exchange treatment "if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a
dividend." To qualify under (b)(1) a shareholder must have a "meaningful reduction of
[his] proportionate interest in the corporation." United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301,
313 (1970). If a redemption meets any one of the § 302(b) tests, it qualifies for exchange
treatment even though it may fail to meet the other tests. I.R.C. § 302(b)(5).
7. I.R.C. § 304(a)(1).
8. But for § 304, a shareholder controlling two corporations could take cash out of
one of them by selling to that corporation the stock in the other. Since the transaction
would amount to the sale of a capital asset, the shareholder would be entitled to capital
gain treatment. He would thus be able to receive corporate earnings at favorable rates
without losing control of either of the two corporations. Despite the vehement objection
of the Commissioner, prior to the 1954 Code such bailouts were held to be successful.
E.g., Commissioner v. Pope, 239 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1957); see B. BiTrKER & J. EusTICE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 9.30 (3d ed. 1971).
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hands). 9 In the case posited, A would not meet the tests of section
302,10 and the redemption would therefore be treated as a distribution
under section 301 rather than as a sale or exchange of stock. 1I Assum-
ing adequate earnings and profits in Corporation X, the transaction
would produce ordinary income to A in the full amount of the purchase
price. 12
Section 351 of the Code deals with transfers of property to con-
trolled corporations. It provides that "[n]o gain or loss shall be recog-
nized if property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons
solely in exchange for stock or securities in such corporation and
immediately after the exchange such person or persons are in control 13
. . . of the corporation." 14 Section 351(b) then goes on to provide that
if there is property (boot) other than stock or securities in the transac-
tion, gain will be recognized, but not in excess of the amount of the
boot. 15 Section 351(b), therefore, taxes the lesser of the boot or the
gain.
In 1954, Congress added § 304 specifically to deal with this problem. See S. REp. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 43-46 (1954), reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4621, 4674-77.
9. I.R.C. § 304(b)(1). The corporation distributing the cash in exchange for the
stock is referred to in the statute as the "acquiring corporation." The corporation whose
stock is being transferred is called the "issuing corporation."
10. A can meet neither the § 302(b)(3) test of complete termination of his interest in
X nor the § 302(b)(2) test of a substantially disproportionate redemption. This is true no
matter how much of his Y stock is purchased by X, because X's ownership of Y stock is
attributed to A under § 318(a)(2)(C). Therefore, by application of that section, A owns
one hundred percent of X both before and after the transactions. (Section 318 attribu-
tion rules apply to § 302 by virtue of § 302(c)(1)).
A also fails to meet the "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" test of § 302(b)(1),
since after attribution there is no reduction of his interest. See note 6 supra.
I. I.R.C. § 302(d).
12. The distribution is treated as ordinary income only if it is a dividend. I.R.C. §
301(c). Section 316(a) provides that: "Mhe term 'dividend' means any distribution of
property made by a corporation to its shareholders-(1) out of its earnings and profits
accumulated after February 28, 1913, or (2) out of its earnings and profits of the [current]
taxable year .... Section 304(b)(2)(A) states that in a § 304(a)(1) distribution, it is the
earnings and profits of the acquiring corporation which control. Therefore, if X, the
acquiring corporation, has sufficient earnings and profits, current or accumulated, the
distribution to A is a dividend in toto and included in gross income under § 301(c).
13. For purposes of § 351 "control" is defined in § 368(c) as "the ownership of stock
possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of
stock of the corporation." Cf. note 5 supra (defining § 304 "control").
14. I.R.C. § 351(a).
15. Id. § 351(b). Section 351(b) furnishes a way back into § 351 for taxpayers who do
not receive solely stock and securities as subsection (a) requires. But the price of re-
entry is recognition of the lesser of (1) the gain realized or (2) the amount of money
received plus the fair market value of any other property received. In the § 351 context
19781
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The purpose of section 351 is to avoid levying a tax on mere
changes in the form of an investment. 16 It is normally thought of as
covering original incorporation transactions, but it also applies to post-
incorporation transfers, provided the control test is met. 17 To illustrate:
if A owns 70% of Corporation X and transfers property to Corporation
X in exchange for an additional 10% stock interest, plus cash, section
351 would cover the transaction and only the lesser of the gain or the
boot (cash) would be recognized and taxed. If the property transferred
were a capital asset held by A for more than a year, the gain would be
long-term capital gain. 18
H. THE "CoNFLIcT"
The application of sections 304 and 351 is probably clear enough
so long as each operates within its particular sphere. However, cases
have arisen which appear to fall under both sections, and, therefore,
seem to involve a direct conflict between them.19 In its most simple
form the typical situation is as follows: A owns 100% of the stock of
Corporations X and Y. A transfers some or all of the stock in X to Y
in exchange for additional stock in Y and some cash. Assume that the
X stock which is transferred has a basis of 100 and a fair market value
of 200 and assume further that A receives stock in Y worth 50 plus
cash of 150. Under these circumstances, it appears that the transaction
falls under section 30420 and that the cash of 150 is to be treated as a
the gain realized will be measured by the difference between (1) the sum of the fair
market value of the stock and the amount of the cash and (2) the basis of the property
transferred to the corporation. See I.R.C. § 1001 (a).
16. B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 8, 3.01, at 3-3 to 3-4 (citing and quoting S.
REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 181, 188-89).
17. B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 8, 3.01, at 3-2 to 3-3.
18. I.R.C. §9 1221, 1222(3). The holding period for long-term status is one year for
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1977. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-455, § 1402(a)(1), (2), 90 Stat. 1731.
19. E.g., Commissioner v. Stickney, 399 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1968), aff'g sub nom.
Henry McK. Haserot, 46 T.C. 864 (1966), on remand from Commissioner v. Haserot,
355 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1965), remanding Henry McK. Haserot, 41 T.C. 562 (1964)
[hereinafter referred to as the Haserot litigation]; Rose Ann Coates Trust v. Commis-
sioner, 480 F.2d 468 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973), aff'g 55 T.C. 501
(1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Coates Trust litigation]; cf. Milton Falkoff, [1977]
TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) 77,093, at 427-28 (§ 304, and not § 351, governs the
acquisition by a subsidiary of its parent's stock in three other subsidiaries in partial
satisfaction of a debt owed by the parent to the subsidiary because there was no issuance
of securities by the acquiring subsidiary corporation).
20. A "controls" two corporations, X and Y, within the meaning of § 304(c), and in
return for property (the cash) one of the corporations (Y) acquires stock in the other
corporation (X) from him. See I.R.C. § 304(a)(1); note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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distribution in redemption of the stock of y. 2 1 Since A cannot meet
any of the tests of section 302(b), as applied to his Corporation X stock
interest,22 the cash becomes a section 301 distribution, and the result
(assuming adequate earnings and profits in Y) is ordinary income to A
in the amount of 150.23
However, the transaction also appears to fall under section 351.
Immediately after the transaction, A controls Corporation y 24 and has
transferred to Y property (stock in X) for Y stock and boot (the
cash),25 As a result, under section 351(b) taxable gain is limited to the
lower of the gain (100) or the boot (150).26 Further, since the stock
transferred is a capital asset held for more than one year, the gain is
long-term capital gain. 27
III. THE AuTnoRrrmEs
Naturally, the taxpayer would prefer to have section 351 treat-
ment,28 and in the first presentation to the courts of the general fact
pattern discussed above, the taxpayer succeeded in convincing the Tax
Court, in Henry McK. Haserot,2 9 and the Sixth Circuit, in Commis-
21. I.R.C. § 304(a)(1).
22. Applying § 304(b) mandates the application of the § 302(b) tests, see note 6
supra, to the issuing corporation's (X's) stock. See note 9 supra. A cannot meet the §
302(b)(3) or (b)(2) tests with respect to his X stock because ownership of X stock is
attributed to him from corporation Y which he wholly owns. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(C). See
note 10 supra. A, therefore, has not had a complete termination of his interest in X nor a
substantially disproportionate redemption. Furthermore, A does not meet the § 302(b)(1)
test since there is no "meaningful reduction of [his] proportionate interest" in X due to
attribution to him of the X stock through Y. See notes 6, 10 supra.
23. I.R.C. § 302(d); id. § 301(a), (c).
24. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
25. I.R.C. § 351(b); see notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
26. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
27. I.R.C. § 1222(3).
28. See I.R.C. §§ 1201-02.
29. 41 T.C. 562 (1964). In the Haserot litigation, see note 19 supra, the facts were
essentially as follows. Before the transactions in question, the petitioner-taypayer own-
ed a controlling stock interest in three corporations: Northport, Gypsum, and Haserot
(referred to by the court as "Company"). Company and Gypsum were controlled by
petitioner directly. Company in turn owned most of the remaining stock of Gypsum and
some of the remaining stock of Northport. The balance of the Northport stock was
owned by Gypsum. Petitioner transferred his entire stock interests in Northport and
Gypsum to Company for additional Company stock and a cash credit to his account with
Company. The Tax Court summarized the changes in stock ownership as follows:
Before the transactions, the ownership of the corporations was ....
Northport (4,562 shares): Petitioner, 1,999; Gypsum, 1,312; Company, 1,250;
others, 1.
Gypsum (6,582 shares): Petitioner, 4,486; Company 2,022; others, 74.
Company (33,014 shares): Petitioner, 18,895; petitioner's son, 1,023; estate of
1978]
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sioner v. Stickney,3° that where both sections appear to govern, section
351 controls. 31 Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit took the opposite
petitioner's father, 10,293; others, 2,803.
After the transactions, the ownership was as follows:
Northport (4,562 shares): Company, 3,249; Gypsum, 1,312; others, I.
Gypsum (6,582 shares): Company, 6,508; others, 74.
Company (35,446 shares): Petitioner, 29,188; petitioner's son, 3,455; others
2,803.
If we look only to the shares registered in petitioner's name, his percentage
of control is as follows:
Northport Gypsum Company
percent percent percent
Before ............. 43.8 68.2 57.2
After ............... 0 0 82.3
However, the Company owned shares in both Gypsum and Northport. A
majority of the issued and outstanding shares of the Company were registered
in petitioner's name and he therefore could dictate actions to be taken by
Company with respect to its Northport and Gypsum shares. As a result,
petitioner had effective control of a majority of the shares of all three corpora-
tions, as revealed by the following table:
Northport Gypsum Company
percent percent percent
Before ............. 99.9 98.9 57.2
After ............... 99.9 98.9 82.3
Finally, if we apply the attribution rules of section 318, the following pattern
of petitioner's control appears:
Company Gypsum Northport
percent percent percent
Before ............. 91.5 96.3 96.6
After ............... 92.1 91.1 91.8
Henry McK. Haserot, 46 T.C. 864, 866-67 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
The Commissioner argued that § 304 applied to the transaction because petitioner
controlled (as defined in § 304(c)) Northport, Gypsum, and Company, and transferred
stock in the first two to Company for property. The taxpayer, on the other hand,
contended that § 351 governed because he had transferred property (the Northport and
Gypsum stock) to a corporation (Company) in exchange for stock and cash and was in
control of the transferee corporation immediately after the transfer.
30. 399 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1968) (Stickney was Haserot's executor and a substitute
party on appeal).
31. In the first trial before the Tax Court it was held that § 351 governed the
transaction. Henry McK. Haserot, 41 T.C. 562 (1964). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit did
not decide which section controlled but remanded for a determination of whether the
transaction was essentially equivalent to a dividend within the meaning of § 302(b).
Commissioner v. Haserot, 355 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1965). The Tax Court then decided this
issue in the affirmative but refused to reconsider its earlier decision as to the applicabili-
ty of § 304. Henry McK. Haserot, 46 T.C. 864 (1966). In a separate opinion, Judge
Tannenwald, who was joined by Judge Simpson, dissented from the court's decision not
to reconsider and stated that he felt that § 304 controlled. Id. at 872-78. However, the
Sixth Circuit finally agreed with the majority of the Tax Court and held that § 351
governed. Commissioner v. Stickney, 399 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1968). This was a somewhat
surprising result, for if § 351 controlled all along, then whether the distribution was
essentially equivalent to a dividend under § 302 was irrelevant, and there should not have
been a remand in the first place.
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position in Rose Ann Coates Trust v. Commissioner32 and held that
section 304 is predominant.
As might be expected, there have been several articles on the
subject. Some commentators have pointed out the bailout possibilities
available under section 351 in the related corporation setting.33 Others
have approached the problem from a policy standpoint and have
suggested compromise solutions. 34 A few have claimed that the
conflict between the sections is irreconcilable on the face of the statute
and have called for a legislative response to the dilemma. 35 It is the
position of this writer, however, that a simple understanding of the
statutory scheme, as evidenced by the legislative history of section
351, will lead to the conclusion that there is no conflict between the
32. 480 F.2d 468 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973), aff'g 55 T.C. 501
(1970). The Coates family group owned all of the stock of two corporations, CAM
Industries and Washington Industrial Products (WIP). The family attempted to merge the
two corporations by selling the WIP stock to CAM under an agreement calling for the
payment of the purchase price over a ten-year period with four percent annual interest.
The Commissioner argued that the family was a group of persons controlling (as defined
in § 304(c)) two corporations and transferring stock in one to the other for property (the
sale agreements) so that § 304 applied. The taxpayer-trust contended that § 351 applied
because property (the WIP stock) had been transferred for "securities" (the sale agree-
ments) to CAM, which was controlled by the taxpayer and others in the transferring
group, immediately after the transfer. The Tax Court avoided the problem by holding §
351 inapplicable because no non-recognition property (stock or securities) had been
received. Rose Ann Coates Trust v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 501 (1970). The Ninth
Circuit, however, squarely faced the issue and stated that § 304 overrides § 351. Rose
Ann Coates Trust v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1973).
33. See, e.g., Lefevre, Purchases of Stock by Related Corporations-Acquisitions or
Redemptions?, TUL. 14TH TAX INST. 441, 456-58 (1965); Note, Conversion of Brother-
Sister Corporations into a Parent-Subsidiary Relationship-A Legitimate Tax-Saving
Device or an Unwanted Dividend?, 5 MEM. ST. L. REV. 31 (1974); Note, Section 351
Precludes Dividend Treatment of "Boot" Paid in a Section 304 Redemption of Brother-
Corporation Stock Even When the "Boot" is Essentially Equivalent to a Dividend, 45
TEX. L. REV. 771, 775-77 (1967); 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 856, 858-59 & n.25 (1968).
34. E.g. Marans, Section 304: The Shadowy World of Redemptions Through Related
Corporations, 22 TAX L. REv. 161, 189-97 (1967); Marans, The Shadowy World Re-
visited, 22 TAX L. REv. 721, 722-23 (1967).
35. See, e.g., Kempf, Section 304 of the Internal Revenue Code: Unmasking Dis-
guised Dividends in Related Corporation Transactions, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 60, 80-81
(1965); 12 DuQ. L. REV. 678, 687 (1974); cf. Marans, Section 304: The Shadowy World of
Redemptions Through Related Corporations, supra note 34, at 191-92, 216-19 (espous-
ing the necessity for a legislative response, but also offering a § 304-351 combination
approach as an alternative to a re-working of the Internal Revenue Code); Note, Conver-
sion of Brother-Sister Cdrporations Into a Parent-Subsidiary Relationship-A Legitimate
Tax-Saving Device or an Unwanted Dividend?, 5 MEM. ST. L. REV. 31, 39-40 & n.59
(1974) (favoring the resolution of the conflict adopted by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Commissioner v. Stickney, 399 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1968), and proposing an
amendment to §§ 351 and 302(d) which would require § 304 to yield to § 351 when a
transaction falls within the purview of both sections).
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two sections, and that with respect to any cash3 6 involved in such
transactions, section 304 must prevail over section 351.
IV. THE ARGUMENTS
In order to put the problem in perspective, however, it might be
appropriate to review, briefly, the arguments raised thus far. They run
along the following lines:
First, for the taxpayer, it is pointed out that section 304 refers to a
transfer of stock in return for property,37 and that for purposes of
section 304, the term "property" as defined in section 317(a) specific-
ally excludes "stock in the corporation making the distribution
.... ,,38 Therefore, the inclusion of stock in the transaction prevents
section 304 from operating. 39
The answer to this line of analysis, as pointed out by Judge
Tannenwald, in his separate opinion in Henry McK. Haserot, is that
section 304 does not say "solely in return for property," and that
Congress knows how to use the word "solely" when this is its
intention.' Furthermore, the exclusion of stock from the definition of
property in section 317(a) might simply mean that the stock in a
Haserot-type transaction is to be ignored, with the result that only the
cash received by the shareholder would be taxed,41 a limitation the
government was ready to accept in the original Haserot case itself. 42
36. The same principle would apply to any other § 317 property. See text accom-
panying notes 37-39 infra.
37. I.R.C. § 304(a)(1)(B).
38. Section 317(a) provides: "[T]he term 'property' means money, securities, and
any other property; except that such term does not include stock in the corporation
making the distribution .... "
39. Henry McK. Haserot, 46 T.C. 864, 873 (1966) (Tannenwald, J., separate
opinion).
40. Id. at 874-75.
41. Id.
42. Henry McK. Haserot, 41 T.C. 562, 569 (1964). An argument apparently related
to the § 317 "property" argument is based upon the notion that § 304 applies only to sales
("sale" meaning a transfer for cash or its equivalent), whereas § 351 applies to both sales
and exchanges ("exchange" referring to a transfer for property other than cash or its
equivalent). This argument appears to be based upon the use of the term "sales" in the
legislative history under § 304 rather than upon the phrase "sales or exchanges." Henry
McK. Haserot, 46 T.C. 864, 874 (1966); Marans, Section 304: The Shadowy World of
Redemptions Through Related Corporations, supra note 34, at 188. The transaction at
issue in Haserot would be an exchange under this analysis, since both cash and stock
were received; therefore, only § 351 would apply to the transaction. See Commissioner
v. Stickney, 399 F.2d 828, 834 (6th Cir. 1968); Henry McK. Haserot, 46 T.C. at 873-74
(Tannenwald, J., separate opinion); Marans,, Section 304: The Shadowy World of Re-
demptions Through Related Corporations, supra note 34, at 188-89.
The answer to this line of reasoning is that in using the terms "sell" and "sold"
Congress was not drawing a distinction between "sale" and "exchange" but was simply
[Vol. 28:289
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A second major argument supporting the taxpayer's position cen-
ters on the dependence of section 304 on sections 301 and 302 and the
"except as otherwise provided" language contained in sections 301
and 302. Section 301(a) begins with the language, "Except as other-
wise provided in this chapter . . .";43 similarly, section 302(d) be-
gins, "Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter .... "44
Sections 301, 302, 304, and 351 are all in the same chapter, 1, and
subchapter, C. However, section 351 does not contain any "except as
otherwise provided" language. Therefore, since sections 301 and 302
contain this limitation while section 351 does not, and since 304 is
dependent upon sections 301 and 302 through sections 304(a) and (b),
sections 301, 302, and 304 must yield to section 351 when both
sections 304 and 351 are applicable to the same set of facts. 45
A response to this argument, and that offered by most commen-
tators,46 is that the "except as otherwise provided" language in sec-
using the terms as a short-hand way of describing the type of transaction involved. This
phraseology, therefore, is simply too slender a reed upon which to base such a major
decision of substantive law. Henry McK. Haserot, 46 T.C. at 874; Marans, Section 304:
The Shadowy World of Redemptions Through Related Corporations, supra note 34, at
189 n.114; see H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1950). Furthermore, "sale"
is not referred to in § 304 itself; § 304 refers to "acquisition," a term which encompasses
a broader spectrum of transactions than the term "sale." Henry McK. Haserot, 46 T.C.
at 874; Marans, Section 304: The Shadowy World of Redemptions Through Related
Corporations, supra note 34, at 189 n. 114; see H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
A79, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4216 (where the language
of the House version of § 304(a) was "proceeds of such sale"). Finally, no reason
appears why a "sale," Le., an exchange for cash or its equivalent, ought to be treated
differently from any other exchange. But see Marans, Section 304: The Shadowy World
of Redemptions Through Related Corporations, supra note 34, at 188-89.
43. The full sentence reads: "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a
distribution of property (as defined in section 317(a)) made by a corporation to a
shareholder with respect to its stock shall be treated in the manner provided in subsec-
tion (c)." I.R.C. § 301(a).
44. The full sentence reads: "Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, if a
corporation redeems its stock (within the meaning of section 317(b)), and if subsection
(a) of this section does not apply, such redemption shall be treated as a distribution of
property to which section 301 applies." I.R.C. § 302(d).
45. This analysis-was the basis of the Tax Court's original holding in Henry McK.
Haserot, 41 T.C. 562, 570 (1964), subsequently affirmed by the Sixth Circuit in Commis-
sioner v. Stickney, 399 F.2d 828, 834-35 (6th Cir. 1968).
46. See, e.g., Kempf, supra note 35, at 70-73; Marans, Section 304: The Shadowy
World of Redemptions Through Related Corporations, supra note 34, at 186. But see
Note, Section 351 Precludes Dividend Treatment of "Boot" Paid in a Section 304
Redemption of Brother-Corporation Stock Even When the "Boot" is Essentially Equiva-
lent to a Dividend, 45 TEx. L. REV. 771, 775 (1967). See also Henry McK. Haserot, 46
T.C. 864, 875-78 (1966) (Tannenwald, J., separate opinion).
The position taken by these authorities is also defended by the Commissioner: The
"except" clause in § 302(d) was meant to follow the words "such redemption" in that
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tions 30117 and 302 is in the statute to accomodate other redemption
and distribution sections, such as 303, 331, and 346,48 but that this
language does not go so far as to accommodate section 351.
Next, for the taxpayer, there is offered what might be called the
"lazy person's view of the statute." Section 351 is simple to read and
easy to understand and by its terms applies to the transaction in a fairly
straightforward manner. The application of section 304, on the other
hand, depends upon the applicability of a host of related sections (such
as sections 301, 302, and 318), many of which are quite complicated.
Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy, where both sections
apply to the same transaction, section 351 should be held to control.
Lest one answer this line of reasoning by suggesting that it is absurd on
its face, it should be noted that the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Commis-
sioner v. Stickney contains language coming quite close to this
analysis.4 9
Then, on the government's behalf, one of the strongest arguments is
the absurdity-of-result analysis. No statute should be interpreted so as to
create an absurd result, and under the Sixth Circuit's decision in the
Haserot litigation, absurdity is the order of the day. 50 On the Haserot
facts, 51 with section 351 controlling, a shareholder who ends up with
section and to accommodate only other redemption sections. The "except" clause in §
301(a) was meant to follow the words "a distribution" in that section and to accommo-
date only other distribution sections. Therefore, these clauses do not accommodate §
351, which is neither a redemption nor a distribution section. Kempf characterizes the
Commissioner's position as a middle ground between the taxpayer's argument that the
"except" clauses are all-inclusive in accommodating every section in subchapter C
(referring to the "except as otherwise provided in this subchapter" language of § 302(d))
or in chapter 1 (referring to the "except as otherwise provided in this chapter" language
of § 301(a)), including § 351, and the argument that the "except" clauses only accommo-
date those Code sections which explicitly refer to §§ 301 and/or 302 (i.e., §§ 331(b) and
346(c)). Kempf, supra note 35, at 71.
47. Of course, § 301 also accommodates § 302.
48. Section 303 provides exchange treatment for distributions in redemption of stock
to pay administrative, funeral, and estate tax expenses. Sections 331 and 346 provide
exchange treatment for distributions in complete or partial liquidation. I.R.C. §§ 303,
331,346.
49. [A] comparison of. . . Section 351 and the facts clearly demonstrates the
applicability of § 351. In marked contrast, if Section 304(a) also applies, that can
only be determined by laboring through a labyrinth of related sections. Section
304 is not self-executing in any sense, and where it has application the tax
liability can only be determined by reading other sections in pari materia.
399 F.2d at 834.
50. See Henry McK. Haserot, 46 T.C. 864, 876-77 (1966) (Tannenwald, J., separate
opinion); Rev. Rul. 73-2, 1973-1 C.B. 171 (announcing that the Internal Revenue Service
will not follow the Sixth Circuit's decision in Stickney); Kempf, supra note 35, at 74; 37
U. CIN. L. REV. 856, 860-61 (1968).
51. See note 29 supra.
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more than 80% of the stock of the acquiring corporation will receive
sale-or-exchange treatment by virtue of section 351 ;52 one who ends up
with less than 50% will get sale-or-exchange treatment by virtue of the
inapplicability of section 304;53 but one who ends up with between
50% and 80% may be saddled with ordinary income treatment by
virtue of section 304.54 Thus, shareholders who have very little
common control and those possessing a great deal of common control
will all receive capital gain treatment while those in between will
receive ordinary income treatment. To avoid this, the argument goes,
the statute should be interpreted so that section 304 controls.
Finally, for the government, several additional reasons are offered
for treating section 304 as predominant. First, since section 304 is
more recent legislation than section 351 (when predecessor sections
are taken into account), section 304 expresses current legislative in-
tent.55 Second, section 304 should prevail because it is more specific in
its treatment of related corporations. 56 Third, analogous cases indicate
that "section 351 will give way when its literal application tends to
frustrate another section of the Code." '57 Last, it is contended that the
transaction in question is more like the "narrow group" of transactions
covered by section 304 than the "broad range" 58 of transactions
covered by section 351. 59
52. See notes 14-18 supra and accompanying text.
53. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.When a taxpayer is outside § 304, he
generally receives capital gain tax treatment for the sale of his stock under §§ 1001, 1221,
and 1222. See note 8 supra.
54. He possesses sufficient control under § 304(c) to trigger the operation of § 304,
but insufficient control under § 368(c) to fall within § 351. See notes 5, 13 supra.
55. See Kempf, supra note 35, at 74. See also Rev. Rul. 73-2, 1973-1 C.B. 171. The
answer here may be that Congress was well aware of the existence of § 351 when it
enacted § 304 and did not indicate that § 304 should predominate.
56. Kempf, supra note 35, at 74; Marans, Section 304: The Shadowy World of
Redemptions Through Related Corporations, supra note 34, at 187; accord, Rev. Rul.
73-2, 1973-1 C.B. 171. The logical response here'might be that § 351 is more specific in
its treatment of transfers of property to controlled corporations.
57. Kempf, supra note 35, at 74 (citing National Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 137
F.2d 600 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1973), and Rooney v. United States, 305
F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962), both concerning a conflict between §§ 351 and 482, or the
predecessors thereof). But see Henry McK. Haserot, 41 T.C. 562, 571-72 (1964).
58. Kempf, supra note 35, at 74.
59. One additional argument has been advanced to resolve the supposed conflict
between §§ 304 and 351. In the original Tax Court proceeding in the Haserot litigation,
the taxpayer sought to bolster the argument that the § 301(a) "except" language accom-
modated § 351 by citing the cross reference to § 351 in the predecessor of § 301(e)(3). The
Commissioner quickly responded that § 7806(a) states that cross references between
Code sections shall be given no legal effect. However, the Commissioner too seemed to
be straining when he suggested that § 7806(a) also applied to the "except" clauses in §§
301(a) and 302(d). Kempf, supra note 35, at 69.
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V. THE STATUTORY SCHEME
Unfortunately, the arguments outlined above have been generally
inconclusive. It might, therefore, be better to try a different approach
and concentrate on the language of section 351 rather than on that of
section 304 and its related sections.
As previously noted, section 351 provides that when boot is re-
ceived upon a transfer to a controlled corporation, gain is recognized to
the extent of the boot. 6° But it is of some interest that nowhere in
section 351 itself does the statute describe how that gain is to be
treated-whether as ordinary income or as capital gain. It has been
suggested, therefore, that perhaps the amount of taxable income (the
gain) could be determined under section 351, while the treatment of
that income could be determined under sections 301 through 304.61
'Thus, returning to the case posited earlier, 62 assume that A, owning
100% of Corporations X and Y, transfers to Y some of his X stock
with a fair market value of 200 and a basis of 100, in exchange for Y
stock worth 50 and cash of 150. The amount of gain realized would be
the difference between the amount realized (200) and the adjusted
basis (100), and the gain recognized would be the lesser (100) of the
gain realized (100) or the boot (150).63 But the treatment of that
gain would be determined under section 304. The result would, there-
fore, be ordinary income of 100, as opposed to ordinary income of 150
had the transaction been treated solely under section 304. 64
60. I.R.C. § 351(b); see note 15 supra and accompanying text.
61. This § 304-351 combination approach was discussed, but rejected, by Marans.
Marans, Section 304: The Shadowy World Revisited, supra note 34, at 722-23. Instead,
Marans favored having the stock received by the controlling shareholder from the
acquiring corporation treated under § 351 while the § 317 property is treated under § 304
and its related sections. Marans, Section 304: The Shadowy World of Redemptions
Through Related Corporations, supra note 34, at 191-96. This latter treatment is in
accord with the current position of the Internal Revenue Service. See Rev. Rul. 73-2,
1973-1 C.B. 171. It appears to depend, however, on § 304 being held to be predominant
over § 351 and, therefore, begs the essential question. Indeed, once it is determined that
§ 304 governs with respect to § 317 property, it makes little difference to either the
government or the taxpayer under what section the stock is treated, since both generally
would agree that receipt of the stock is a non-recognition transaction.
Marans has also suggested the possibility of applying § 301 "roughshod" to the § 351
boot and ignoring §§ 302 and 304. Marans, Section 304: The Shadowy World of Redemp-
tions Through Related Corporations, supra note 34, at 194-95. However, as Marans
himself notes: "Congress specifically omitted from section 351 of the 1954 Code even a
cross reference to section 301." Id. at 187 & n. 103. Furthermore, it has been suggested
that since Congress specifically provided for dividend treatment of boot in § 356, a
provision analogous to § 351, it may well have intended that § 351 boot not receive any
type of dividend treatment. 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1151, 1154 & n.29 (1964).
62. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
63. I.R.C. § 351(b); see note 15 supra and accompanying text.
64. See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
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The problem with this approach, the taxpayer will argue, is that the
sale of a capital asset, the X stock, receives ordinary income treatment
in apparent contradiction of the sale-or-exchange sections, 65 which
dictate that gain realized on the sale of a capital asset shall be treated as
a capital gain.66 The government's answer is likely to be that section
304 precludes sale-or-exchange treatment unless the transaction can
pass the tests of section 302(b). 67 The taxpayer will no doubt then fall
back upon the "except as otherwise provided" language, pointing out
that the sale-or-exchange sections are in the same chapter as section
301.68 Therefore, even with respect to the treatment of the recognized
gain, sections 301 and 304 must yield to other sections, in this case the
sale-or-exchange sections, and, thus, the analysis has come full circle.
Or has it?
If in fact the "except as otherwise provided" language of section
301(a) forces section 304 to yield to the sale-or-exchange sections in
this case, then section 304 will never operate in any case.69 Since every
redemption through related corporations is ostensibly a sale, the sale-
or-exchange sections would always govern.70 Thus, a literal reading
and application of the "except as otherwise provided" language in
section 301 would effectively eliminate sections 301, 302, 303, 304,
331, and 346 from the Code.
For this reason the sale-or-exchange sections must yield to section
304 in this case, and indeed in every case of redemptions through
related corporations. Carrying this analysis one step further, however,
it becomes clear that section 351 should not be involved in the Haserot
problem at all, at least insofar as the transaction includes section
317(a) property. 71 Section 351 does not operate in a vacuum. Instead,
section 351 is a non-recognition provision, the sole function of which
is to operate as an exception to the general rule of the sale-or-exchange
sections. This limited role of section 351 is made clear by its legisla-
tive history. In the 1939 Code, the predecessors to section 1001(c) and
65. I.R.C. §§ 1001-24, 1201-54 [hereinafter referred to as the "sale-or-exchange
sections"].
66. Sections 1001(a) and 1001(c) are the general Code provisions for the computation
and recognition of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Sections
1201 through 1254 provide that the gain so recognized may be taxed at favorable capital
gains rates if the property sold is a capital asset. I.R.C. §§ 1001(a), (c), 1201-54.
67. See note 6 supra.
68. See notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
69. See Brief for Appellant at 20, Commissioner v. Stickney, 399 F.2d 828 (6th Cir.
1968).
70. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
71. The stock could still be treated under § 351. See note 61 supra.
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section 351 were contained in the same section, namely section 112,
which read as follows:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-Upon the sale or exchange of
property the entire amount of gain or loss, determined under
section 111, shall be recognized, except as hereinafter pro-
vided in this section.
(b)(5) TRANSFER TO CORPORATION CONTROLLED BY
TRANSFEROR.-No gain or loss shall be recognized if property
is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely
in exchange for stock or securities in such corporation, and
immediately after the exchange, such person or persons are
in control of the corporation .... 72
When the 1954 Code was adopted, section 112 was split into numerous
other sections. The general rule of section 112(a) was placed in section
100273 (which became section 1001(c) in the Tax Reform Act of
1976). 74 The rules of section 112(b) through (n) were placed in sec-
tions 351 through 368, 75 as well as other sections.76 However, the
language of section 112(a) remained substantially unchanged,"7 as did
much of the language of sections 112(b) through (n). 78 The only
72. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(a), (b)(5), 53 Stat. 37 (now I.R.C. §§ 1001(c),
351).
73. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 422, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4621, 5065; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A265 (1954), reprinted
in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4407.
74. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 merely moved § 1002 to § 1001(c), which previously
had contained a cross reference to § 1002; no substantive change was made. Pub. L. No.
94-455, §§ 1901(a)(121), 1901(b)(28), 90 Stat. 1784, 1799.
75. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 264-75, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE &
AD. NEws 4621, 4681-83; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. Al 16-34, reprinted in
[1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4017, 4253. In reference to § 351, the Senate
Report states: "This section is derived from section 112(b)(5) and section 112(c) and (e)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and is generally similar to section 351 of the House
Bill." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 264, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4621, 4785.
76. For example, § 112(b)(1) of the 1939 Code became § 1031(a) of the 1954 Code; §
112(n), which was added to the 1939 Code by the Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 318, 65
Stat. 494, became § 1034 of the 1954 Code. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 108-10,
reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4741; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. A268-69, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4410.
77. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 422, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4621, 5065; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A265, reprinted in
[1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4407 ("Except for conforming clerical
changes, this section [1002, now § 1001(c)] is the same as 112(a) of the 1939 Code. No
substantive change is made.").
78. Compare S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 264-75, reprinted in [1954] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4681-83, with H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
Al 16-34, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4017, 4253-73.
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change made in section 112(a) was to replace the language "except as
hereinafter provided in this section" with the language "except as
otherwise provided in this subtitle." This was obviously done to
accommodate the placement of sections 112(b) through (n) in sections
317 through 368 and other sections scattered throughout subtitle A.
Congress did not, however, intend this revision of the Code to expand
the function of sections 112(b) through (n) beyond that of operating
simply as exceptions to the general rule of section 112(a). Indeed, the
House Ways and Means Committee report states, "Section 351 corre-
sponds in general to section 112(b) (5) of the 1939 Code. No change in
present law is intended by your committee as respects the basic
purpose of this section. "79
The point here is that just as one could not reach section 112(b)(5)
(the exception to the sale-or-exchange rule for transfers to controlled
corporations), under the 1939 Code, without first being subject to
section 112(a) (the basic sale-or-exchange provision), so one cannot
reach section 351 today without first being subject to the sale-or-
exchange sections. And when dealing with a redemption through
related corporations, one never reaches the sale-or-exchange sections
unless the transaction is subject to characterization as a sale or ex-
change under the tests of sections 302 and 304. In other words, section
351 provides that certain sales or exchanges are tax-free, or only taxed
in part, but in the related corporation stock purchase situation, at least
insofar as the section 317 "property" portion of the transaction is
concerned, there is no sale or exchange in the first place unless the
tests of sections 302 and 304 are met.80
79. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. Al 16, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4254 (emphasis added). See also S. REP. NO. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 264, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4681.
Earlier versions of the Internal Revenue Code followed the same statutory scheme as
that of the 1939 Code: § 351 predecessors were exceptions to § 1001(c) predecessors.
Therefore, it is quite likely that when Congress rearranged the Code in 1954, but declared
that it intended "no change" in the "basic purpose" of §§ 351 and 1002, it wished to
maintain the traditional relationship between the two sections. This relationship dates
back to the Revenue Act of 1921 in which § 202(c) followed the pattern of setting out the
§ 1001(c) predecessor in its first paragraph and the § 351 exception in its subsection (3).
Rev. Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 227, reprinted in J. SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938-1861, at 789 (1938). Section 203 of the
1924 Act continued the same pattern, § 203(a) being the predecessor of present § 1001(c),
and § 203(b)(4) being the exception and predecessor to present § 351. Rev. Act of 1924,
ch. 234, § 203, 43 Stat. 253, reprinted in J. SEIDMAN, supra at 687, 690. In commenting on
the 1924 arrangement, the House Ways and Means Committee declared: "It appears best
to provide generally that gain or loss is recognized from all exchanges and then except
specifically and in definite terms those cases of exchange in which it is not desired to tax
the gain or allow the loss." H.R. REP. No. 179,68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1924) (emphasis
added); see J. SEIDMAN, supra at 687.
80. An argument along the same lines as that discussed in the text was presented to
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VI. CONCLUSION
As the legislative history indicates, the statutory scheme of the
Code requires, as a first step, the application of sections 302 and 304 to
any property distribution of a corporation to a shareholder to determine
if that which appears to be a sale or exchange of his stock is to be so
treated in fact. If the tests of these sections can be met, then the sale-
or-exchange provisions come into play to give the taxpayer long-term
capital gain instead of ordinary income. Finally, as an exception to the
sale-or-exchange sections, there are provisions such as section 351
which provide that in certain cases no gain at all need be recognized.
The statute thus lays down the general rule of ordinary income for
related corporation redemption-type distributions, to which there is an
exception for capital gain treatment in certain cases, to which there is a
further exception of non-recognition in still more limited cases. To go
to the most remote exception (section 351) first and ignore the general
rule (sections 302 and 304) is simply not proper statutory construction.
Under this statutory scheme there is no real conflict between sections
304 and 351, and if section 351 enters the analysis at all, it does so
only after the cash or other section 317 property has been treated8 l
under section 304 and consequently sections 302 and 301.82
the Sixth Circuit in the original Haserot litigation. However, the character of § 351 as an
exception to the rule of § 1002 while mentioned, was not emphasized; more importantly,
no legislative history was brought forth to demonstrate the correctness of the proposi-
tion. Instead, the government relied upon the "plain words" of the statute which the
court apparently did not find quite so plain. Brief for the Petitioner at 19, Commissioner
v. Stickney, 399 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1968) ("The Tax Court failed to consider that section
304 was intended to remove brother-sister redemptions from the sale or exchange
category and that the plain words of the statute accomplish this result.").
81. See note 61 supra.
82. One possible response to the argument presented in the text is that if §§ 301
through 304 supersede § 351, they would also supersede the reorganization provisions-
§§ 354 through 368, and the dividend section in ;those provisions, § 356, would be
rendered unnecessary. There are two responses to this argument. First, § 356 is slightly
older than § 302, and it is possible that when § 302 was enacted, § 356 was retained either
through oversight or as a result of an abundance of caution. Section 356(a)(2) first
appeared substantially in its present form in § 203(d)(2) of the 1924 Revenue Act. Rev.
Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(d)(2), 43 Stat. 253, reprinted in J. SEIDMAN, supra note 79, at
693. Section 302 did not appear until § 201(g) of the 1926 Act. Rev. Act of 1926, ch. 27, §
201(g), 44 Stat. 9, reprinted in J. SEIDMAN, supra note 79, at 577. Prior to the 1926 Act,
the essentially-equivalent-to-a-dividend test only applied to redemptions of, or
redemptions associated with, stock dividends.
Second, §§ 302, 304, and 301 might not cover all distributions made in reorganiza-
tions. For example, distributions from the acquiring corporation in a statutory merger to
the shareholders of the acquired corporation are arguably outside the scope of §§ 301 and
302, because they are not distributions by a corporation with respect to its own share-
holders. Therefore, the function of § 356 is to pick up that transaction. In this regard it is
of some interest to note, however, that the Internal Revenue Service's position in the
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reorganization area appears to be that § 301 may govern a given distribution before the
rest of the transaction is treated under 99 354-368. See Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 C.B. 62;
Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1 (1) (1955).
One further point bearing mention is that in 1954 the Senate rejected a provision in
the House bill, H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 306 (1954), which would have subjected
all distributions of property in connection with § 351 and the reorganization provisions to
§ 301. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 43, 230, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4674, 4867; Marans, Section 304: The Shadowy World of
Redemptions Through Related Corporations, supra note 34, at 188 & nn. 109-11. But
such a rejection is by no means a rejection of the application of 99 302 and 304 to
§ 351 and reorganization-type transactions specifically falling within the terms of §§ 302
and 304. Cf. Marans, Section 304: The Shadowy World of Redemptions Through Related
Corporations, supra note 34, at 191 and n. 119 (finding this legislative history to be no
bar to a § 304-351 combination approach). Indeed, in light of the statutory scheme
outlined above, see notes 72-80 supra and accompanying text, the House's proposal
might merely have been considered unnecessary.
